CRM on React Router v8, Postgres (Neon) and Supabase Auth
Sales CRM: companies, contacts, named pipelines, deal-stage tracking, and an append-only activity trail.
56 files, 4 tables and 166 lines of schema, verified 2026-08-23 on React Router v8, Postgres (Neon) and Supabase Auth.
15 pinned upstream versions
request path. session validation runs in server components and route handlers, not at the edge
What you're getting
React Router v8 (framework mode): SSR, config/file routes under app/, loaders/actions, and resource routes for API endpoints.
Postgres on Neon via Drizzle ORM and the postgres-js driver.
Supabase Auth: hosted identity (GoTrue) via the @supabase/ssr cookie client; email+password + OAuth.
Sales CRM: companies, contacts, named pipelines, deal-stage tracking, and an append-only activity trail.
Setup
bun add react-router react react-dom drizzle-orm postgres @supabase/ssr @supabase/supabase-jsDATABASE_URLNeon pooled (-pooler) connection stringNEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URLNext: your Supabase project URL (RR: VITE_SUPABASE_URL · Nuxt: NUXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL)NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEYNext: the project's anon/public key (RR: VITE_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY · Nuxt: NUXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY)SUPABASE_URLReact Router server-side (loaders): same project URL, read off process.env — never inlined into the client bundleSUPABASE_ANON_KEYReact Router server-side: same anon keyApply the schema with bunx drizzle-kit push
Initialization
Database client
Sales CRM schema: companies, contacts, pipelines, deals & activities
5 tables, 28 columns and 11 indexes and constraints, applied to a live Postgres (Neon) and asserted to materialize.
companies4 columns · 2 indexedcontacts6 columns · 3 indexedpipelines3 columns · 1 indexeddeals9 columns · 3 indexedactivities6 columns · 2 indexedWhat this schema is built to answer
A group-by over deals.stage, served by idx_deal_stage. Stage is text under deals_stage_check rather than an enum, so the board's columns move with a constraint swap, and amount_cents (bigint cents) sums exactly for the per-stage total.
activities is read through idx_activity_deal_time on (deal_id, occurred_at): the leading column picks the deal, the trailing one supplies the ordering, so a timeline is an index range scan and not a sort.
contacts.owner_id is a text FK to Better Auth's user.id, indexed as idx_contact_owner — one scan returns a rep's whole book without touching companies or deals.
idx_contact_company on contacts.company_id lists a company's roster; idx_company_domain on companies.domain is how an inbound lead gets matched to an existing account before the contact row is written.
idx_deal_contact on deals.contact_id joins the account view to the pipeline, and the FK cascades — a contact erased on request takes their deals, and the activities under those deals, in one statement.
Companies & contactsaccount records (companies de-duped on domain) and the contacts that belong to them, with nullable company FK to support unattached leads
Pipelines & dealsnamed sales pipelines and the opportunities (deals) moving through them, each carrying a contact FK, an owner FK to Better Auth user, and amount stored as integer cents
Deal stage trackingstage column on deals enforced by CHECK constraint with an index that powers pipeline-board grouping by stage
Activity interaction logappend-only calls/emails/notes logged against a deal by a Better Auth actor, forming the per-deal audit timeline
Deploy targets
The app UI
Decisions and compatibility
Framework mode (not data/library mode): routes live under app/, declared in app/routes.ts. API endpoints are resource routes (a route module exporting loader/action but no default component).
Data flows through loaders (run on the server before render) and actions (mutations); components read it with useLoaderData / useActionData. There are no React Server Components — every server-rendered route is a loader plus a client component.
Auth gates in the loader, not in middleware: a protected route's loader calls requireAuth(request), which throws a redirect Response that React Router short-circuits on — so a logged-out user never reaches the protected data or renders the page.
The `@/` import alias maps to app/ (this framework's source root), so shared modules like @/lib/auth resolve under app/ — the one path prefix that differs from Next's src/, which is why the auth slice's mount code is framework-specific.
prepare: false is mandatory — Neon's pooled endpoint is PgBouncer in transaction mode, where server-side prepared statements break across the pool.
Drizzle is paired here (not Prisma): Prisma's prepared-statement reliance is incompatible with transaction-mode pooling.
Hosted: Supabase owns identity in its managed auth.users. This stack emits a LOCAL `user` mirror (db/auth-schema.ts) so app-type schemas can foreign-key `user` directly — keep it in sync with a Supabase trigger on auth.users (insert/update → public.user). The drizzle migration only owns the mirror table's shape, not the trigger.
Sessions are cookie-based (@supabase/ssr): the proxy refreshes them on every request; Server Components read the user via supabase.auth.getUser().
Deal stage is text + CHECK ('lead','qualified','won','lost') on the deals table — new stages ship without an ALTER TYPE migration; the idx_deal_stage index drives the pipeline board's 'deals grouped by stage' query.
activities is append-only (no updates, no deletes cascaded from deal): the per-deal timeline is always a raw log, never a mutated summary, queried via idx_activity_deal_time (deal_id, occurred_at).
How this stack fits together
Supabase Auth owns its identity tables in the same database as companies, contacts, pipelines, deals and activities, so the foreign keys reference the local user row directly and a delete cascades through them. No mirror, no webhook, and no window where the two stores disagree.
Postgres (Neon) stores those surrogate keys as uuid, so every foreign key across the 5 tables and 28 columns below is a uuid column. The migration was applied to a live Postgres (Neon) and the tables asserted, not just type-checked.
CRM
Five tables carry the sales layer, and the spine runs companies → contacts → deals → activities. Each link is a foreign key with a deliberate delete rule: contacts.company_id is nullable and ON DELETE SET NULL, because a lead exists before you know their employer and losing an account record should not take the person with it; deals.contact_id cascades, so deleting a contact takes their opportunities and, through activities.deal_id, the interaction trail underneath them. deals.pipeline_id has no delete rule at all, which means the database refuses to drop a pipeline that still holds deals — a pipeline is configuration, and silently emptying a board is worse than an error. Identity is borrowed, never declared.
Better Auth owns user, and this schema references user.id three times: contacts.owner_id and deals.owner_id name the rep accountable for a record, activities.actor_id names whoever logged the call. Those columns are text rather than uuid because Better Auth's user.id is text, and recasting it would break the constraint. Two columns are constrained instead of typed. deals.stage and activities.type are text with CHECK constraints — deals_stage_check over lead/qualified/won/lost, activities_type_check over call/email/note — so shipping a 'negotiating' stage is a constraint swap rather than an ALTER TYPE mid-deploy. Money is amount_cents, a bigint of integer cents, so a forecast is exact addition with no float anywhere near it. companies.domain gets an index but not a unique: it is the key you de-duplicate accounts on, not a rule that prevents two Acme rows.
The consequence of this shape is that it is record-scoped, not tenant-scoped. There is no organizations table, no row-level security, no billing and no metering; 'my deals' means owner_id = me, expressed in your query rather than enforced by the database, and owner_id is indexed on contacts but not on deals. What you get cheaply is the board and the timeline: idx_deal_stage buckets every deal by stage, and idx_activity_deal_time (deal_id, occurred_at) returns one deal's history already in order, out of a table nothing is designed to update.
React Router v8
React Router v8 in framework mode puts everything under app/, and `@/` maps to that root instead of Next's src/ — the one prefix that differs, which is why shared modules like @/lib/auth and @/db/schema stay byte-identical to their Next counterparts. initCode writes app/lib/db.ts, then the auth fragment adds app/lib/auth.ts, the resource route app/routes/api.auth.$.ts, and app/lib/require-auth.ts. The route table itself is app/routes.ts: routes are declared configuration, and a file becomes a URL because that table says so. There are no React Server Components here. Every server-rendered route is a loader plus an ordinary client component: the loader runs on the server before render, the component reads its result with useLoaderData, and mutations go through an action read back with useActionData.
An API endpoint is the same module minus the default export — a resource route, named with the flat dotted convention (app/routes/api.auth.$.ts for the auth splat, app/routes/webhooks.polar.ts for a webhook POST). Auth gates in the loader rather than in a middleware layer. A protected route awaits requireAuth(request) from app/lib/require-auth.ts, which calls auth.api.getSession({ headers: request.headers }) — a real server-side validation, not a cookie peek — and throws redirect("/sign-in") when there is no session. React Router treats a thrown Response as the route's outcome, so the loader short-circuits and neither the protected query nor the component ever runs. The trade that follows: there is no matcher array to widen and no edge tier to keep honest, but protection is per-route discipline.
A new route is protected because its loader calls requireAuth; forget the call and the page is public. In return, every gate sits one function call away from the data it guards, the session is already in hand when the loader queries db, and the same request-in / Response-out contract covers pages, API endpoints and the auth mount alike.
Postgres (Neon)
Postgres here is Neon reached through postgres-js, with Drizzle's pg-core dialect on top: drizzle({ client }) over a single module-level postgres(DATABASE_URL, { prepare: false }). That flag is not a preference. Neon's pooled (-pooler) endpoint is PgBouncer in transaction mode, where a backend is handed to a different session between statements, so server-side prepared statements break across the pool — and the same constraint is why this axis pairs with Drizzle rather than Prisma. One client per module is enough: PgBouncer and the runtime do the pooling, so there is no globalThis singleton dance. The schemas built on this dialect make three recurring type decisions. Primary keys are uuid(...).primaryKey().defaultRandom(), so ids come from the database. Timestamps are timestamp(..., { withTimezone: true }).defaultNow() — timestamptz, an absolute instant.
Closed value sets are text plus a CHECK constraint rather than pgEnum, so shipping a new role or subscription status is an ordinary constraint change instead of an ALTER TYPE migration. Counters are bigint({ mode: "number" }), and Better Auth's text user.id is referenced as text by the app tables rather than recast. Operationally, transaction-mode pooling forbids anything that spans statements on one backend: LISTEN/NOTIFY, session-scoped SET, advisory-lock sessions, WITH HOLD cursors. Those paths use Neon's direct endpoint instead. The connection client also changes with the deploy target — max: 1 per short-lived serverless instance, a real reused pool (max 10, idle_timeout 20) in a long-running Node process, and on Cloudflare Workers postgres-js is replaced outright by @neondatabase/serverless over HTTP, because Workers have no TCP sockets.
The capability that exists only on this side of the matrix is row-level security. Multi-tenant schemas ship ENABLE plus FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY with policies keyed on current_setting('app.current_org_id', true), which withTenant() sets per transaction — unset context yields no rows, so isolation fails closed inside the database rather than in application code. It requires a dedicated NOBYPASSRLS role: Neon's default neondb_owner carries BYPASSRLS, and connecting as it makes every policy silently inert.
Supabase Auth
Supabase Auth is a hosted service — GoTrue — that your app reaches over cookies rather than an SDK session object. Credentials and the canonical user records live in Supabase's managed auth.users schema. What lands in your own database is a mirror: db/auth-schema.ts declares user keyed by the Supabase auth uid (text; varchar(255) on MySQL) with email, full name, avatar URL and timestamps, so app-type schemas can foreign-key user exactly as they would under a self-hosted auth. Unlike the Clerk fragment, no sync webhook is emitted here, because Supabase's own trigger mechanism is the intended path: a trigger on auth.users writing into public.user lives in the Supabase project, not in the drizzle migration.
The migration owns the mirror's column shape and nothing else, so wiring that trigger is a step you take before those foreign keys mean anything. The mechanic that actually shapes this adapter is cookie refresh. @supabase/ssr rotates the auth token, and a rotated cookie only reaches the browser if something writes it onto the outgoing response — which is why every framework branch is built around the same getAll/setAll pair, wired to whatever that framework calls a cookie jar. Next's src/proxy.ts rebuilds the NextResponse inside setAll before calling getUser().
React Router has no middleware layer, so app/lib/supabase/server.ts constructs the client per request and returns { supabase, headers }, and the protected layout route attaches those headers to both exits — the redirect and the pass-through — so a refresh that happened during a guard is not lost. Nuxt's server/utils/supabase.ts binds the client to the h3 event and writes through setCookie, with a Nitro middleware doing the guard. Every decision point calls supabase.auth.getUser(), never getSession(): getSession reads whatever the cookie claims, getUser revalidates it against Supabase. Because a browser client is emitted alongside the server one, the auth screens are real forms calling supabase.auth.signInWithPassword rather than a hosted widget, and the sidebar's user menu subscribes to onAuthStateChange. Two consequences to plan around.
The anon key is public by design and is inlined into the client bundle under whichever prefix the framework demands (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, NUXT_PUBLIC_), so protection has to come from row-level security on Supabase's side, not from keeping the key quiet. And every guard is a network call to Supabase, not a local query — cheap, but not free, and on the path of every protected request.
