AI Wrapper on React Router v8, MySQL 8 and Better Auth
AI-wrapper app: per-user profile extending Better Auth, per-call token metering, and append-only prompt/completion history.
53 files, 3 tables and 115 lines of schema, verified 2026-08-23 on React Router v8, MySQL 8 and Better Auth.
16 pinned upstream versions
request path. session validation runs in server components and route handlers, not at the edge
What you're getting
React Router v8 (framework mode): SSR, config/file routes under app/, loaders/actions, and resource routes for API endpoints.
MySQL 8 via Drizzle ORM and the mysql2 driver.
Better Auth: self-hosted auth running inside your app against your Postgres (Drizzle adapter).
AI-wrapper app: per-user profile extending Better Auth, per-call token metering, and append-only prompt/completion history.
Setup
bun add react-router react react-dom drizzle-orm mysql2 better-authDATABASE_URLMySQL connection string (mysql://…)BETTER_AUTH_SECRETgenerate with `openssl rand -base64 32`BETTER_AUTH_URLyour app's base URLApply the schema with bunx drizzle-kit push
Initialization
Database client
AI app schema: user profiles, token metering & prompt logs
3 tables, 24 columns and 8 indexes and constraints, applied to a live MySQL 8 and asserted to materialize.
user_profiles6 columns · 3 indexedtoken_usage7 columns · 3 indexedprompt_logs11 columns · 2 indexedWhat this schema is built to answer
A range scan on token_usage through idx_usage_user_time (user_id, created_at), summing prompt_tokens plus completion_tokens and cost_microcents. user_id is the leading column, so the month boundary costs nothing beyond the range itself.
One probe of user_profiles on its UNIQUE user_id — the 1:1 foreign key into user — to read monthly_token_budget, compared against the idx_usage_user_time rollup. The bigint is a soft cap the dispatch path checks; no database constraint backs it.
idx_usage_model on token_usage.model groups spend by provider model id without touching user_profiles at all, and cost_microcents being an integer means the sum stays exact however many sub-cent rows it covers.
prompt_logs read back along idx_log_user_time (user_id, created_at), newest first. Prompt, completion, latency_ms and the JSON metadata all live on the row, so the feed renders from one index range with no join to token_usage.
status is held to three values by prompt_logs_status_check but carries no index of its own, so count it inside a bounded idx_log_user_time range rather than scanning prompt_logs by status across all users.
User profiles extending Better Authone profile per Better Auth user, carrying default model preference and soft monthly token budget
Per-call token usage & cost meteringappend-only rows (one per upstream LLM call) that drive the per-user budget rollup and cost reporting
Prompt & completion log historyauditable record of every exchange — prompt, completion, token split, latency, and ok/error/filtered status
Deploy targets
The app UI
Decisions and compatibility
Framework mode (not data/library mode): routes live under app/, declared in app/routes.ts. API endpoints are resource routes (a route module exporting loader/action but no default component).
Data flows through loaders (run on the server before render) and actions (mutations); components read it with useLoaderData / useActionData. There are no React Server Components — every server-rendered route is a loader plus a client component.
Auth gates in the loader, not in middleware: a protected route's loader calls requireAuth(request), which throws a redirect Response that React Router short-circuits on — so a logged-out user never reaches the protected data or renders the page.
The `@/` import alias maps to app/ (this framework's source root), so shared modules like @/lib/auth resolve under app/ — the one path prefix that differs from Next's src/, which is why the auth slice's mount code is framework-specific.
mysql2's pool multiplexes connections; drizzle-orm/mysql2 wraps it. One module-level pool is right for a serverless/edge app — the runtime and the pool handle concurrency.
MySQL has no row-level security: multi-tenant isolation is enforced in application code via the forOrg helper (src/lib/tenant.ts), not by the database. See the tenant-scoping section on SaaS pages.
Self-hosted: Better Auth owns the user/session/account/verification tables. This stack emits them (db/auth-schema.ts) and hands them to the Drizzle adapter, so app-type schemas can foreign-key `user` directly.
user_profiles.userId carries a UNIQUE constraint — it is the 1:1 extension of Better Auth's user row; the FK itself is the identity, so no separate join table is needed.
token_usage is append-only and stores cost as costMicrocents (bigint integer): no float money, fine-grained enough for sub-cent per-token pricing without a numeric type.
MySQL provides no row-level security. On MySQL, multi-tenant isolation is APP-ENFORCED via the forOrg helper (src/lib/tenant.ts), not database-enforced like Postgres RLS. Every org-scoped query MUST go through forOrg — a missed query leaks across tenants. Postgres cells enforce this in the database itself (RLS), so it holds even for a query that forgets to scope.
How this stack fits together
On React Router v8 this stack puts its MySQL 8 client at app/lib/db.ts and the Better Auth instance at app/lib/auth.ts and session checks in app/lib/require-auth.ts. Those are the paths this framework's adapter actually emits, not a shared convention: the same AI Wrapper schema and the same Better Auth wiring land somewhere different on each of the other frameworks in the registry.
Better Auth owns its identity tables in the same database as user_profiles, token_usage and prompt_logs, so the foreign keys reference the local user row directly and a delete cascades through them. No mirror, no webhook, and no window where the two stores disagree.
MySQL 8 stores those surrogate keys as varchar(36), so every foreign key across the 3 tables and 24 columns below is a varchar(36) column. The migration was applied to a live MySQL 8 and the tables asserted, not just type-checked.
AI Wrapper
Three tables sit on top of the identity Better Auth owns, and the line between them is settings on one side, records of calls that already happened on the other. user_profiles is the 1:1 extension of the identity row: user_id is both a foreign key into user and a UNIQUE constraint, which is what makes it an extension rather than a collection, and it holds the two values the wrapper reads at call time — default_model (text, defaulting to gpt-4o-mini) and monthly_token_budget (bigint). token_usage takes one row per completed provider call: the model billed, the prompt/completion token split, and cost_microcents as a bigint, because a float accumulating over millions of sub-cent rows is how rounding error ends up in an invoice.
prompt_logs takes one row per exchange — prompt text, completion (nullable, so a streamed response can be logged before it finishes), latency_ms, a status narrowed by prompt_logs_status_check to 'ok', 'error' or 'filtered', and a JSON metadata bag that absorbs finish_reason, tool calls, and whatever else a provider invents, without forcing a column migration each time. The two append-only streams are deliberately not wired to each other. Both reference user.id directly and no key connects a usage row to the log row for the same call, so metering and logging fail independently on the hot path — the cost of that is you cannot ask what one specific prompt cost without matching on user and timestamp yourself.
What the streams do share is their index: idx_usage_user_time and idx_log_user_time are the same (user_id, created_at) composite, so every cheap question here has the shape of this user, this window. Fleet-wide reads get exactly two handles — idx_usage_model on the billed model and idx_profile_model on the profile default — and nothing else. There is no index on status, so a failure-rate query is a filter applied inside a user-and-time range. The budget is a number in a column rather than a constraint: nothing in the database refuses an over-budget call, so enforcement is a profile read plus a range sum you run before dispatch.
React Router v8
React Router v8 in framework mode puts everything under app/, and `@/` maps to that root instead of Next's src/ — the one prefix that differs, which is why shared modules like @/lib/auth and @/db/schema stay byte-identical to their Next counterparts. initCode writes app/lib/db.ts, then the auth fragment adds app/lib/auth.ts, the resource route app/routes/api.auth.$.ts, and app/lib/require-auth.ts. The route table itself is app/routes.ts: routes are declared configuration, and a file becomes a URL because that table says so. There are no React Server Components here. Every server-rendered route is a loader plus an ordinary client component: the loader runs on the server before render, the component reads its result with useLoaderData, and mutations go through an action read back with useActionData.
An API endpoint is the same module minus the default export — a resource route, named with the flat dotted convention (app/routes/api.auth.$.ts for the auth splat, app/routes/webhooks.polar.ts for a webhook POST). Auth gates in the loader rather than in a middleware layer. A protected route awaits requireAuth(request) from app/lib/require-auth.ts, which calls auth.api.getSession({ headers: request.headers }) — a real server-side validation, not a cookie peek — and throws redirect("/sign-in") when there is no session. React Router treats a thrown Response as the route's outcome, so the loader short-circuits and neither the protected query nor the component ever runs. The trade that follows: there is no matcher array to widen and no edge tier to keep honest, but protection is per-route discipline.
A new route is protected because its loader calls requireAuth; forget the call and the page is public. In return, every gate sits one function call away from the data it guards, the session is already in hand when the loader queries db, and the same request-in / Response-out contract covers pages, API endpoints and the auth mount alike.
MySQL 8
MySQL 8 here is the mysql2 driver under Drizzle's mysql-core dialect: drizzle({ client: pool }) over one module-level mysql.createPool(DATABASE_URL). mysql2's pool multiplexes connections itself, so a single pool per module is the right shape — the runtime and the pool handle concurrency, with no globalThis singleton needed. The framework decides where that file lands (src/lib/db.ts on Next, app/lib/db.ts on React Router, server/lib/db.ts on Nuxt); the client text is the same in all three. The dialect's constraints show up directly in the column types.
MySQL cannot index a TEXT column without a prefix length, so anything that is a primary key, a UNIQUE, an index or a CHECK target is varchar with a declared length: ids are varchar(36) with no database default — the application generates them with crypto.randomUUID(), since there is no uuid type and no defaultRandom() — Better Auth's user.id and every FK pointing at it are varchar(255), an email or slug is varchar(255), a role or status varchar(32), a SHA-256 hex digest varchar(64). Free-form columns nobody indexes stay text. Timestamps are plain timestamp().defaultNow() without the withTimezone flag the Postgres bodies carry, and counters are bigint({ mode: "number" }). The operational difference that matters most: MySQL has no row-level security.
There is no policy layer to fall back on, so multi-tenant isolation is enforced in application code by forOrg(db, orgId) in src/lib/tenant.ts, which wraps each org-owned table's select/update/delete with a where on organization_id and throws on a missing orgId instead of quietly running unscoped. It is a real boundary only while every read and write goes through it — the shared plans catalog sits deliberately outside — and it is app-enforced, not database-enforced. Connections change with the deploy target: connectionLimit 2 per short-lived serverless instance, 10 in a long-running Node process, and on Cloudflare Workers mysql2 cannot run at all — there are no TCP sockets — so the edge client swaps to @planetscale/database over HTTP with drizzle-orm/planetscale-serverless.
Better Auth
Better Auth is a TypeScript library, not a service. The process that serves your pages is the process that hashes passwords and issues sessions, and the session rows sit in the same database as your application data. This fragment authors the four tables Better Auth expects — user, session, account, verification — into db/auth-schema.ts and passes that module to drizzleAdapter(db, { provider, schema: authSchema }) inside lib/auth.ts. Better Auth never creates tables at runtime; its CLI normally generates them, and authoring them here means the identity schema goes through the same migration proof as the app-type tables.
user.id is a bare text primary key (varchar(255) on MySQL, which cannot index TEXT without a prefix length) carrying no database default, because Better Auth generates the id and sends it in the insert. That is precisely what lets an app-type schema foreign-key user.id and cascade on delete. Session validation happens at two different strengths, deliberately. Next's src/proxy.ts calls getSessionCookie(request), which only asks whether the cookie is present: it runs at the edge, touches no database, and exists to bounce logged-out traffic before render. The authoritative check is auth.api.getSession({ headers }), and it runs inside the protected surface — requireUser() in src/lib/session.ts on Next, requireAuth(request) in app/lib/require-auth.ts on React Router, and the Nitro handler at server/middleware/auth.ts on Nuxt.
The last two do the real lookup on every guarded request, since neither framework has an edge proxy to peek with. The remaining emitted files are the mount: toNextJsHandler(auth) behind a [...all] route on Next, a resource route delegating to auth.handler on React Router, an h3 catch-all wrapping toWebRequest on Nuxt, plus a Vue auth client there. The auth instance imports the db client the framework already exported, so both share one pooled connection. What you inherit is ownership. Sessions join to your own tables, a user delete is a foreign-key cascade rather than a sync job, and drift arrives through your lockfile instead of a vendor's release notes.
The same ownership is the cost: password recovery only delivers if an email fragment is composed in — Better Auth's own server returns 400 "Reset password isn't enabled" until emailAndPassword.sendResetPassword is set — and rotating BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is yours to schedule.
