IoT telemetry on React Router v8, MySQL 8 and Better Auth
IoT telemetry: user-owned devices, append-only sensor readings, threshold alert rules, and fired alert instances.
58 files, 3 tables and 88 lines of schema, verified 2026-08-23 on React Router v8, MySQL 8 and Better Auth.
16 pinned upstream versions
request path. session validation runs in server components and route handlers, not at the edge
What you're getting
React Router v8 (framework mode): SSR, config/file routes under app/, loaders/actions, and resource routes for API endpoints.
MySQL 8 via Drizzle ORM and the mysql2 driver.
Better Auth: self-hosted auth running inside your app against your Postgres (Drizzle adapter).
IoT telemetry: user-owned devices, append-only sensor readings, threshold alert rules, and fired alert instances.
Setup
bun add react-router react react-dom drizzle-orm mysql2 better-authDATABASE_URLMySQL connection string (mysql://…)BETTER_AUTH_SECRETgenerate with `openssl rand -base64 32`BETTER_AUTH_URLyour app's base URLApply the schema with bunx drizzle-kit push
Initialization
Database client
IoT telemetry schema: devices, readings, alert rules & alerts
4 tables, 23 columns and 8 indexes and constraints, applied to a live MySQL 8 and asserted to materialize.
devices6 columns · 3 indexedsensor_readings5 columns · 2 indexedalert_rules6 columns · 1 indexedalerts6 columns · 2 indexedWhat this schema is built to answer
idx_reading_device_time on (device_id, recorded_at) bounds the scan, and the metric filter is applied inside it — metric is free text with no index, so a second metric on the same chart costs a second pass, not a second index.
devices.device_key is UNIQUE, so one probe turns the key on the wire into the device_id every sensor_readings row is written against. Accepting a reading never touches the user table.
alert_rules is fetched by its device_id foreign key — a handful of rows per device — and comparator, held to gt/lt/gte/lte by alert_rules_comparator_check, picks the comparison against threshold. threshold and value share a type, so no cast enters the compare.
idx_alert_device on alerts.device_id, then status = 'firing' inside that range; resolved_at stays null until something closes the alert, so the two columns have to be written together. alerts carries device_id alongside rule_id precisely so this read never joins through alert_rules.
idx_device_owner on devices.owner_id gathers the fleet, and status is a stored column guarded by devices_status_check, so the split is a group-by over those same rows rather than a rollup across sensor_readings.
Devicesuser-owned device registry with a unique device_key and an online/offline status CHECK
Sensor readings (time-series)append-only rows of metric + numeric value per device, indexed for time-range rollups
Alert rules & alertsper-device threshold rules (gt/lt/gte/lte comparator CHECK) and the alert instances they fire, with firing/resolved lifecycle
Deploy targets
The app UI
Decisions and compatibility
Framework mode (not data/library mode): routes live under app/, declared in app/routes.ts. API endpoints are resource routes (a route module exporting loader/action but no default component).
Data flows through loaders (run on the server before render) and actions (mutations); components read it with useLoaderData / useActionData. There are no React Server Components — every server-rendered route is a loader plus a client component.
Auth gates in the loader, not in middleware: a protected route's loader calls requireAuth(request), which throws a redirect Response that React Router short-circuits on — so a logged-out user never reaches the protected data or renders the page.
The `@/` import alias maps to app/ (this framework's source root), so shared modules like @/lib/auth resolve under app/ — the one path prefix that differs from Next's src/, which is why the auth slice's mount code is framework-specific.
mysql2's pool multiplexes connections; drizzle-orm/mysql2 wraps it. One module-level pool is right for a serverless/edge app — the runtime and the pool handle concurrency.
MySQL has no row-level security: multi-tenant isolation is enforced in application code via the forOrg helper (src/lib/tenant.ts), not by the database. See the tenant-scoping section on SaaS pages.
Self-hosted: Better Auth owns the user/session/account/verification tables. This stack emits them (db/auth-schema.ts) and hands them to the Drizzle adapter, so app-type schemas can foreign-key `user` directly.
devices.device_key carries a unique constraint — it is the physical device's identity token and must be generated once at provisioning time, never regenerated.
sensor_readings is append-only (no update path, composite index on device_id + recorded_at) — roll up by device + time window for dashboards rather than mutating any running aggregate.
MySQL provides no row-level security. On MySQL, multi-tenant isolation is APP-ENFORCED via the forOrg helper (src/lib/tenant.ts), not database-enforced like Postgres RLS. Every org-scoped query MUST go through forOrg — a missed query leaks across tenants. Postgres cells enforce this in the database itself (RLS), so it holds even for a query that forgets to scope.
How this stack fits together
On React Router v8 this stack puts its MySQL 8 client at app/lib/db.ts and the Better Auth instance at app/lib/auth.ts and session checks in app/lib/require-auth.ts. Those are the paths this framework's adapter actually emits, not a shared convention: the same IoT telemetry schema and the same Better Auth wiring land somewhere different on each of the other frameworks in the registry.
Better Auth owns its identity tables in the same database as devices, sensor_readings, alert_rules and alerts, so the foreign keys reference the local user row directly and a delete cascades through them. No mirror, no webhook, and no window where the two stores disagree.
MySQL 8 stores those surrogate keys as varchar(36), so every foreign key across the 4 tables and 23 columns below is a varchar(36) column. The migration was applied to a live MySQL 8 and the tables asserted, not just type-checked.
IoT telemetry
The device stamps the time, not the server: sensor_readings.recorded_at is notNull with no default, so whatever the firmware puts on the wire is what lands. A gateway buffering through an outage therefore replays honestly, its backlog keeping true instants instead of collapsing onto the moment it reconnected — and readings arrive out of order as a matter of course, so the latest reading for a device means ordering by recorded_at, never taking a max of anything else. Readings are a narrow long table: device_id, a free-text metric, a value, and that timestamp. On Postgres value is numeric, which is arbitrary precision; on MySQL it is decimal(20,6), because a bare mysql decimal is (10,0) and would silently round every temperature to a whole degree.
Six fractional digits is the ceiling on that side. Devices are the scoping root. device_key is UNIQUE and serves as the hardware's identity at ingest — issued once at provisioning, and the only credential this schema knows about. owner_id foreign-keys Better Auth's user, with idx_device_owner behind the fleet list. status is a stored flag held to 'online' or 'offline' by devices_status_check; it is not derived from readings, so a heartbeat job or the ingest handler has to write it, and it stays wrong until something does. The alerting half is two tables rather than one because a declaration and a firing have different lifetimes.
alert_rules is a per-device threshold — a metric, a comparator held by alert_rules_comparator_check to gt, lt, gte or lte, and a threshold in the same numeric type as value — and nothing stops several rules covering one metric. alerts is the instance: status guarded to 'firing' or 'resolved', triggered_at defaulted, resolved_at nullable until something closes it. It stores both rule_id and device_id even though the device is reachable through the rule, and that redundancy is the point — idx_alert_device answers what is firing on this device with no join. Cascades run the whole way down from devices, so decommissioning one deletes its readings, its rules and its alert history in a single statement. If the telemetry has to outlive the hardware, keep the device row and stop writing to it.
React Router v8
React Router v8 in framework mode puts everything under app/, and `@/` maps to that root instead of Next's src/ — the one prefix that differs, which is why shared modules like @/lib/auth and @/db/schema stay byte-identical to their Next counterparts. initCode writes app/lib/db.ts, then the auth fragment adds app/lib/auth.ts, the resource route app/routes/api.auth.$.ts, and app/lib/require-auth.ts. The route table itself is app/routes.ts: routes are declared configuration, and a file becomes a URL because that table says so. There are no React Server Components here. Every server-rendered route is a loader plus an ordinary client component: the loader runs on the server before render, the component reads its result with useLoaderData, and mutations go through an action read back with useActionData.
An API endpoint is the same module minus the default export — a resource route, named with the flat dotted convention (app/routes/api.auth.$.ts for the auth splat, app/routes/webhooks.polar.ts for a webhook POST). Auth gates in the loader rather than in a middleware layer. A protected route awaits requireAuth(request) from app/lib/require-auth.ts, which calls auth.api.getSession({ headers: request.headers }) — a real server-side validation, not a cookie peek — and throws redirect("/sign-in") when there is no session. React Router treats a thrown Response as the route's outcome, so the loader short-circuits and neither the protected query nor the component ever runs. The trade that follows: there is no matcher array to widen and no edge tier to keep honest, but protection is per-route discipline.
A new route is protected because its loader calls requireAuth; forget the call and the page is public. In return, every gate sits one function call away from the data it guards, the session is already in hand when the loader queries db, and the same request-in / Response-out contract covers pages, API endpoints and the auth mount alike.
MySQL 8
MySQL 8 here is the mysql2 driver under Drizzle's mysql-core dialect: drizzle({ client: pool }) over one module-level mysql.createPool(DATABASE_URL). mysql2's pool multiplexes connections itself, so a single pool per module is the right shape — the runtime and the pool handle concurrency, with no globalThis singleton needed. The framework decides where that file lands (src/lib/db.ts on Next, app/lib/db.ts on React Router, server/lib/db.ts on Nuxt); the client text is the same in all three. The dialect's constraints show up directly in the column types.
MySQL cannot index a TEXT column without a prefix length, so anything that is a primary key, a UNIQUE, an index or a CHECK target is varchar with a declared length: ids are varchar(36) with no database default — the application generates them with crypto.randomUUID(), since there is no uuid type and no defaultRandom() — Better Auth's user.id and every FK pointing at it are varchar(255), an email or slug is varchar(255), a role or status varchar(32), a SHA-256 hex digest varchar(64). Free-form columns nobody indexes stay text. Timestamps are plain timestamp().defaultNow() without the withTimezone flag the Postgres bodies carry, and counters are bigint({ mode: "number" }). The operational difference that matters most: MySQL has no row-level security.
There is no policy layer to fall back on, so multi-tenant isolation is enforced in application code by forOrg(db, orgId) in src/lib/tenant.ts, which wraps each org-owned table's select/update/delete with a where on organization_id and throws on a missing orgId instead of quietly running unscoped. It is a real boundary only while every read and write goes through it — the shared plans catalog sits deliberately outside — and it is app-enforced, not database-enforced. Connections change with the deploy target: connectionLimit 2 per short-lived serverless instance, 10 in a long-running Node process, and on Cloudflare Workers mysql2 cannot run at all — there are no TCP sockets — so the edge client swaps to @planetscale/database over HTTP with drizzle-orm/planetscale-serverless.
Better Auth
Better Auth is a TypeScript library, not a service. The process that serves your pages is the process that hashes passwords and issues sessions, and the session rows sit in the same database as your application data. This fragment authors the four tables Better Auth expects — user, session, account, verification — into db/auth-schema.ts and passes that module to drizzleAdapter(db, { provider, schema: authSchema }) inside lib/auth.ts. Better Auth never creates tables at runtime; its CLI normally generates them, and authoring them here means the identity schema goes through the same migration proof as the app-type tables.
user.id is a bare text primary key (varchar(255) on MySQL, which cannot index TEXT without a prefix length) carrying no database default, because Better Auth generates the id and sends it in the insert. That is precisely what lets an app-type schema foreign-key user.id and cascade on delete. Session validation happens at two different strengths, deliberately. Next's src/proxy.ts calls getSessionCookie(request), which only asks whether the cookie is present: it runs at the edge, touches no database, and exists to bounce logged-out traffic before render. The authoritative check is auth.api.getSession({ headers }), and it runs inside the protected surface — requireUser() in src/lib/session.ts on Next, requireAuth(request) in app/lib/require-auth.ts on React Router, and the Nitro handler at server/middleware/auth.ts on Nuxt.
The last two do the real lookup on every guarded request, since neither framework has an edge proxy to peek with. The remaining emitted files are the mount: toNextJsHandler(auth) behind a [...all] route on Next, a resource route delegating to auth.handler on React Router, an h3 catch-all wrapping toWebRequest on Nuxt, plus a Vue auth client there. The auth instance imports the db client the framework already exported, so both share one pooled connection. What you inherit is ownership. Sessions join to your own tables, a user delete is a foreign-key cascade rather than a sync job, and drift arrives through your lockfile instead of a vendor's release notes.
The same ownership is the cost: password recovery only delivers if an email fragment is composed in — Better Auth's own server returns 400 "Reset password isn't enabled" until emailAndPassword.sendResetPassword is set — and rotating BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is yours to schedule.
